Opponents of rail transit and TOD have claimed that people
who live within a TOD area choose to use transit not because it is more
economically efficient, but because they prefer a less car-dependent lifestyle (2).
The research literature calls this phenomenon “self-selection bias,” and
acknowledges that it is an important factor in the higher probability of riding
transit for TOD residents. However, opponents of TOD use the findings to claim
that governments should not attempt to change travel behavior because people
who desire to use transit will self-select to live near stations anyway.
Two problems exist with this conclusion. First, it glosses
over the significant role of land use patterns and the built environment in
influencing travel mode decisions. A review of empirical research on the topic
found that every study that attempted to control for self-selection still found
that land use patterns remained significant predictors of transit ridership (3).
For example, a study of Bay Area TODs found that 40% of the ridership bonus
could be attributed to self-selection; so lifestyle preference does not explain
all of the increased ridership TODs generate (4).
Second, we can accept the importance of self-selection, but
still conclude with different policy recommendations. Real estate markets are
imperfect and many factors can disrupt the market from matching supply with
demand. The strong demand for transit-oriented living, and the relatively short
supply of this type of housing, suggests that the real estate market is not
functioning optimally, and policy interventions are needed to stimulate
development in TOD areas. For example, zoning policy may need to change to
respond to the market demand coming from smaller households with less cars.
Location efficient mortgages can increase loan eligibility for those living
near transit by recognizing the personal cost savings of driving less (5).
Self-selection results in increased ridership of people living near transit,
but does not imply that real estate markets are providing the residential
mobility needed for self-selection to happen freely.
Notes
(1) Cervero, R. (2006). Transit oriented development’s ridership bonus: a product of self-selection and public policies.
(2) O’Toole, R. (2010). Urban Transit. Downsizing the Federal Government. Cato Institute. Retrieved at: http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/urban-transit
(3) Cao, X., Mokhtarian, P. L., & Handy, S. L. (2009). Examining the impacts of residential self‐selection on travel behaviour: a focus on empirical findings. Transport Reviews, 29(3), 359-395.
(4) Cervero (2006), p. 25
(5) Cervero (2006), p. 27
Notes
(1) Cervero, R. (2006). Transit oriented development’s ridership bonus: a product of self-selection and public policies.
(2) O’Toole, R. (2010). Urban Transit. Downsizing the Federal Government. Cato Institute. Retrieved at: http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/urban-transit
(3) Cao, X., Mokhtarian, P. L., & Handy, S. L. (2009). Examining the impacts of residential self‐selection on travel behaviour: a focus on empirical findings. Transport Reviews, 29(3), 359-395.
(4) Cervero (2006), p. 25
(5) Cervero (2006), p. 27
Edited by Kelly Sellers
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